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Roark: Roark: Putative Father's Right to Notice of Adoption

PUTATIVE FATHER'S RIGHT TO
NOTICE OF ADOPTION

PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING HIS
CHILD
Lehr v. Robertson'

Beginning in 1972, the Supreme Court has attempted to define parental
rights of putative fathers under the due process and equal protection clauses.2
Since unwed fathers were first extended rights in Stanley v. Illinois,' courts
and commentators 4 have disagreed over the nature of these rights. Of primary
concern is how unwed mothers and fathers may receive differing treatment
under the Constitution. 5 In Lehr v. Robertson,6 the Court refined its views on
putative fathers' parental rights. Nevertheless, much uncertainty remains concerning the validity of adoption statutes and decrees. This dubiety poses
problems for parties seeking adoption or termination of parental rights where
the natural parents are not married.
In Lehr, the Court considered whether the due process and equal protection clauses give a putative father who has not established a substantial relationship with his child an absolute right to receive notice and an opportunity to
1. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
2. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). Although
this issue arises most often in connection with adoption proceedings, the parental rights
of putative fathers can also arise in the context of the right to maintain a tort action
upon the death of an illegitimate child. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352
(1979); see also Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1275-76 (1980); cf Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968) (state may not deny natural mother the right to recover for the
wrongful death of her illegitimate child).
3. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
4. See, e.g., Paulin, Illegitimacy and Family Privacy: A Note on Maternal
Cooperation in Paternity Suits, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 910, 919 (1976); Stenger, Expanding Constitutional Rights of Illegitimate Children (1968-1980), 19 J. FAM. L.
407, 440 (1980-81); Comment, The Emerging ConstitutionalProtection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1584 (1972); Note, The
"StrangeBoundaries" of Stanley: ProvidingNotice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REv. 517, 518 (1973).
5. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott,

434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978).
6.

103 S.Ct. 2985 (1983).
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be heard before the child is adopted. The child, Jessica, was born out-of-wedlock on November 9, 1976. 7 The unwed father, Lehr, lived with the mother
prior to the child's birth; 8 however, his name did not appear on the birth certificate. 9 Although Lehr visited the mother and child every day during their
hospital stay, he did not offer to marry the mother, nor did he live with mother
and child after the birth or provide them with any financial support.' 0 Eight

months after Jessica's birth, her mother married Richard Robertson." On December 21, 1978, the Robertsons filed an adoption petition in the Family

Court of Ulster County, New York. On January 30, 1979, Lehr filed a petition in the Westchester County Family Court requesting a determination of
paternity, an order of support, and reasonable visitation privileges. On March
3, 1979, Lehr alleged that he learned for the first time of the adoption pro-

ceedings pending in Ulster County. Four days later, Lehr's attorney informed
the Ulster County Family Court that he planned to seek a stay of the adoption
proceeding pending the determination of the paternity petition. Nevertheless,
the court entered an adoption order the same day.' 2
Upon motion by the Robertsons, Lehr's paternity petition was dismissed
by the Westchester County Family Court. 13 After unsuccessfully attempting
to appea -the adoption order, 4 Lehr filed a petition with the Ulster County
Family Court to vacate the adoption order. This petition was denied,' 5 and the
denial was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court'6 and the
New York Court of Appeals.17 Lehr appealed to the United States Supreme
7. Id. at 2987.
8. Id. at 2997 (White, J., dissenting). Lehr and Jessica's mother, Lorraine,
cohabitated for approximately two years before the child's birth. Id.
9. Id. Nevertheless, the mother had told friends, relatives, and the New York
State Department of Social Services that Lehr was the father. Id.
10. Id. Lehr claimed that the mother had concealed the child's whereabouts
from the time of her discharge from the hospital until August, 1978. With the help of a
detective agency, Lehr was able to locate Lorraine and Jessica in August, 1978. Lehr
alleged that at that time the mother refused his offer to provide financial assistance for
Jessica. Id.
11. Id. at 2987.
12. Id. at 2987-89. The Ulster County Family Court judge informed Lehr's attorney that he had signed the adoption order earlier that day even though he was aware
of the pending paternity petition because he did not believe he was required to give
notice to Lehr prior to entry of the adoption order.
13. Id. at 2989. Lehr did not appeal this dismissal.
14. Id. at 2989 n.6. Lehr's appeal was dismissed because he had not attempted
to intervene in the adoption proceeding. Id.
15. In re Adoption by Lorraine & Richard Robertson of Jessica Martz, 102
Misc. 2d 102, 423 N.Y.S. 2d 378 (Family Ct. 1979).
16. In re Adoption of Jessica "XX", 77 A.D.2d 381, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1980),
aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 430 N.E.2d 896, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1981), aff'd sub nom., Lehr
v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
17. In re Jessica "XX", 54 N.Y.2d 417, 430 N.E.2d 896, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20
(1981), aff'd sub nom., Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss3/8
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Lehr challenged the constitutionality of the New York adoption proceeding statute 9 on two grounds. 20 First, he asserted that the statute violated the
due process clause because the notice procedure inadequately protected a putative father's opportunity to establish a relationship with his illegitimate
child. He contended that because an unwed father's actual or potential relationship with a child born out-of-wedlock is a protected liberty interest, a putative father has a constitutional right to receive prior notice 2' and an opportunity to be heard before he can be deprived of that interest. 22 Lehr argued
further that even if the New York notice procedure was adequate in the normal case, he was entitled to special notice because the Ulster County Family
Court and the child's mother had knowledge of the pending paternity action in
the Westchester County Family Court.' Lehr also asserted that the genderbased classification in the New York adoption statute violated the equal protection clause because it denied a putative father the right given the mother to
consent to his child's adoption, and because it accorded a putative father fewer
procedural rights than the mother.' 4
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the New York Court of
Appeals. 25 The Court first sought to define the liberty interest at stake. Justice
Stevens' majority opinion noted that in most cases, state law determines the
outcome of legal problems arising from the parent-child relationship.' 6 State
laws almost universally express an "appropriate preference" for the formal
family.2 Justice Stevens also noted that the Constitution occasionally supersedes state law, providing even greater protection for certain formal family
relationships.' 8 In some cases, constitutional protection has been extended to
the relationship between natural parents and children born out-of-wedlock.' 9
18. Id.
19. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983-84).
20. 103 S. Ct. at 2990.
21. In this context, the term "notice" refers to actual and constructive notice, as
provided by state statutes regarding service of process.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 2990.
23. Id. at 2995.
24. Id. at 2990.
25. Id. at 2985, 2997.
26. Id. at 2991 (citing United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 351-53 (1966)).
27. 103 S. Ct. at 2991 (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505
(1977); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977)).
28. 103 S. Ct. at 2991 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
29. 103 S. Ct. at 2991-92. Justice Stevens' opinion discussed three cases in
which the Supreme Court had examined the protection of the natural father's biological relationship with his illegitimate child. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
394 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois 405
U.S. 645, 658 (1972). In Stanley, the Court held unconstitutional under the due process clause an Illinois dependency proceeding statute that removed non-delinquent children from the homes of unwed fathers without notice, hearing, or an opportunity to
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
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These cases establish that the existence of a substantial relationship between
parent and child is relevant in evaluating the rights of the parent and the best
interests of the child. 30 Therefore, an unwed father who demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by participating in the rearing of his child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause.
The "mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection." 311 Lehr had no significant custodial, personal, or financial
relationship with the child and did not seek to establish a legal tie until the
child was two years old. Thus, the Court was concerned only with whether the
New York statute adequately protected Lehr's opportunity to form such a
32
relationship.
Lehr did not qualify to receive notice of the pending adoption proceeding
under New York law. 33 Although section 372-c of the New York Social Services Law34 provides for the establishment of a putative father registry, Lehr
did not register and therefore did not receive notice of the adoption through
the registry system. 35 The Court held that if New York's statutory adoption
scheme was "likely to omit many responsible fathers, and if qualifications for
notice were beyond the control of an interested putative father, it might be
prove fitness. 405 U.S. at 657-58. Since the Court concluded that all Illinois parents
are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on fitness before their children are removed
from their custody, a statute that denied unwed fathers such a hearing while granting
it to other parents was "inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at
658.
Quilloin involved a Georgia statute that authorized the adoption of a child born
out-of-wedlock over the objection of the natural father. The Court held that a statute
which required a mother's consent to the adoption of a child born out-of-wedlock, but
required the father's consent only if he had legitimated the child, did not violate the
equal protection clause. 434 U.S. at 256. The Court also found that the unwed father's
substantive rights under the due process clause were not violated by a "best interests of
the child" standard used in the state's adoption proceedings. Id. at 255.
In Caban, the Court held unconstitutional under the equal protection clause a
New York statute that granted a mother a veto over the adoption of her illegitimate
child but did not grant a similar veto to the natural father who had admitted paternity
and participated in the rearing of the child. 441 U.S. at 393-94.
30. 103 S.Ct. at 2996.
31. Id. at 2993. This is where Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun departed from the majority. The dissenters argued that to determine whether due process
requirements apply in the first place, the Court should look to the nature of the interest
at stake, not the "weight" of the interest. Id. at 2998 (White, J., dissenting). They
argued that the biological connection itself creates a protected interest. Due process
does not require actual notice to every putative father; however, the procedures adopted
by a state must at least represent a reasonable effort to determine the identity of the
putative father and to give him adequate notice. Finally, the dissent argued that Lehr's
constitutional rights were violated because his identity was known yet he was denied an
opportunity to be heard. Id. at 2999-3001 (White, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 2994.
33. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 111-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983-84).
34. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 1983).
35. 103 S.Ct. at 2995.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss3/8
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thought procedurally inadequate."381 In particular, the Court noted that the
right to receive notice is completely within the putative father's control, since
he can guarantee notice by filing with the registry. The Court did not find the
New York statutory scheme arbitrary for not adopting a more open-ended
requirement. Therefore, the New York laws adequately protected the putative
father's inchoate interest in establishing a relationship with his illegitimate
child.37 Nor was Lehr entitled to special notice. "[T]he legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of young children and having the adoption
proceeding completed expeditiously .. .justify a trial judge's determination

to require all interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural requirements of the statute."38
The Court also rejected Lehr's equal protection claim.3 9 Justice Stevens
observed that the New York adoption procedures were designed to promote
the best interests of the child, protect the rights of interested third parties, and
ensure promptness and finality.40 To serve these ends, certain people were
given the right to veto an adoption and the right to receive prior notice of any
adoption proceeding. The mother of an illegitimate child is always in this favored class, but only certain putative fathers are included. 41 The existence or
non-existence of a substantial relationship between parent and child is relevant
in evaluating the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child. Thus,
the equal protection clause does not prevent a state from granting different
legal rights to parents who have not established custodial relationships with
the child from those who have established such a relationship. 4' Because Lehr
had never established a custodial, personal, or financial44 relationship with his
child,'43 the statutes did not deny him equal protection.

The Lehr holding is discouraging in several respects. Lehr made continuous and determined efforts to establish the kind of personal, custodial, and
financial relationships with his child that the Court recognized as deserving of
constitutional protection. 45 Nevertheless, the Court found that he was not entitled to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard in the adoption proceeding. Even though the Ulster County Family Court and the mother had knowledge that Lehr had filed an affiliation proceeding in another court, 46 Lehr was
denied notice and an opportunity to be heard. 4 7 The Court noted that a putative father's inchoate relationship with his child is a liberty interest protected
36. Id. at 2994-95.
37. Id. at 2995.
38. Id.

39. 103 S. Ct. at 2996.
40. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111, 111-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983-84).
41. 103 S. Ct. at 2996.
42. Id. at 2996-97.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 2996.
Id. at 2985.
See text accompanying note 12 supra.
103 S. Ct. at 2995, 2999.
Id. at 2989.
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under the due process clause.4 8 This interest, however, was held to be adequately protected because Lehr's effort did not clearly fall within
any of the
49
statute.
York
New
the
in
listed
notice
for
qualifications
narrow
The Supreme Court sanctioned the mother's determined effort to deprive
Lehr of his opportunity to establish a relationship with his child. The rationalization was that Lehr could have protected this interest by filing with the putative father registry.5 0 By so holding, the Court valued more highly the state's
interest in facilitating the expeditious adoption of young children than the putative father's interest in establishing a significant parental relationship with
his child. The Court could have maintained the basic integrity and underlying
purpose of the New York scheme and still have protected the parental interest
of Lehr. The Court should have held that where a court has actual notice of a
putative father's identity and interest in his child, the father must receive notice of and an opportunity to be heard in any legal proceeding affecting his
parental interest with his child.
The holding is also discouraging because the Court offered little in the
way of a definitive test for assessing the adequacy of notice provisions in other
state statutes. The standard articulated by the Court is that if notice provisions "were likely to omit many responsible fathers, and if qualification for
notice were beyond the control of an interested putative father, it might be
thought procedurally inadequate."'" The tentative nature of this standard creates uncertainty concerning
the adequacy of notice provisions which differ
52
from those of New York.
Missouri has a bifurcated statutory scheme for adoptions: two different
statutes and two different procedures can be involved.53 Under one procedure
(termination-adoption), parental rights are terminated under Missouri Revised
Statutes sections 211.422-.492,11 then the adoption proceedings occur pursuant
to sections 453.015-.170. 55 Under the second procedure (non-termination), the
adoption order is entered under sections 453.015-.170 without prior termina48. Id. at 2994-95.
49. See N.Y. DoM REL. LAW
50. 103 S. Ct. at 2995.
51.

§

111-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983-84).

Id. at 2994-95.

52. The Court left unanswered questions which are certain to arise in the future. For example, where a putative father has established a significant personal,
financial, and custodial relationship with his child, under what circumstances can his
parental rights be terminated without actual notice of the proceedings? Under what
circumstances can a judge require the mother of an illegitimate child to divulge the
name of the father? The dissent argued that "[a]bsent special cirucmstances, there is
no bar to requiring the mother of an illegitimate child to divulge the name of the father
when the proceedings at issue involve the permanent termination of the father's rights."
Id. at 2999 n.5 (White, J., dissenting).
53. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.015-.170 (1978 & Vernon Supp. 1984); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 211.442-.492 (1978 & Supp. 1983); see also Tomlinson v. O'Briant, 634
S.W.2d 546, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
54. (1978 & Supp. 1983).
55. (1978 & Vernon Supp. 1984).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss3/8
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tion of parental rights.5 6 The main difference between the two procedures is
that the termination-adoption procedure must be used when consent is required of one or both parents 57 of the child to be adopted,5 8 but is not waived 9
or otherwise given in writing. 0 Adoptions where the parental rights of putative
fathers are at stake have occurred under both procedures.6 1 These two procedures involve similar, but not identical, requirements for notice directed to
putative fathers.6 2 To determine whether the two statutes and procedures sufficiently protect the constitutional rights of putative fathers, it is necessary to
63
examine the notice provisions applicable for each procedure.
Under the notice provisions for the termination of parental rights proceedings, the parent of the child must be summoned and receive a copy of the
termination petition. 6 4 Section 211.422 also provides, however, that "[t]he father of an illegitimate child shall have no legal relationship unless he, prior to
the entry of the decree under Sections 211.442 to 211.492, has acknowledged
56. Id.
57. "Parent" is defined as "a biological parent or parents of a child as well as
the husband of a natural mother at the time the child was conceived, or a parent or
parents of a child by adoption, including both the mother and the putative father of an
illegitimate child." Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 211.442, 453.015 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
58. See id. § 453.030-.040 (Supp. 1983). The written consent of the parents, or
surviving parent is required when the person sought to be adopted is under 18 years
old, unless one of the exceptions in § 453.040 applies. Exceptions are made where: the
parent is of deficient mental condition; parental rights have been terminated by law;
the right to consent has been waived; the parent has abandoned the child; or the parent's identity is unknown.
59. See id. § 453.050 (juvenile court may permit a parent of a child to waive
the necessity of his or her consent to a future adoption).
60. See id. § 453.030.3.
61. See State ex rel. J.D.S. v. Edwards, 574 S.W.2d 405, 406 (Mo. 1978) (en
banc) (putative father successfully challenged on due process and equal protection
grounds the termination of parental rights statute where the termination proceeding
was a prelude to intended adoption action); State ex rel. T.A.B. v. Corrigan, 600
S.W.2d 87, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (challenge to an order entered in a termination of
parental rights proceeding prior to an adoption proceeding); cf. J.B.B. v. Baby Girl S.,
611 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (appeal of an adoption order by guardian ad
litem raising constitutional questions concerning notice to the putative father where
putative father's rights were not previously terminated under Mo. REV. STAT. §
211.447 (1978)).
62. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.442, .453, .457 (1978 & Supp. 1982); with
id. § 453.015, 453.030-.060 (1978 & Vernon Supp. 1984).
63. This Note does not analyze the constitutionality of the Missouri adoption
and termination of parental rights statutes under the equal protection clause. The Missouri statutes are similar to New York's in that the mother of an illegitimate child has
the right to prior notice of any adoption or termination of parental rights proceeding
while only certain classes of putative fathers have an equivalent right. Since the Court
in Lehr found this distinction to be rational under the equal protection clause, the Missouri statutes would probably be upheld.
64. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.457 (1978). The term "parent" includes "both the
mother and the putative father of an illegitimate child." Id. § 211.442 (Supp. 1983).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
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the child as his own by affirmatively asserting his paternity." 5 Section
211.453 provides that a writ of summons shall be served on a parent whose
identity is known and who can be personally served as provided in chapter
506.6 The court shall not require service "in the case of a parent whose iden' 67
tity is unknown or cannot be ascertained, or cannot be located.
If the father's identity is known and he is subject to service, he is not
entitled to service unless he has affirmatively asserted his paternity. 68 If a putative father's parental rights are terminated under chapter 211, then he is not
entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding under chapter 453.69
Although it is the key to the statutory scheme, the phrase "affirmatively
asserting his paternity" is not defined. Nevertheless, in State ex rel. T.A.B. v.
70
Corrigan,
the court suggested three ways a putative father could satisfy the
standard: (1) filing an affidavit of paternity; (2) placing his name on the birth
71
certificate; or (3) filing with the court the mother's admission of paternity.
The Lehr test for protecting a putative father's inchoate relationship with
his child 2 was that notice procedures might be inadequate if the scheme was
likely to omit many responsible fathers and if qualification for notice was beyond the control of an interested putative father.7 3 Missouri's termination65. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.457 (1978).
66. Id. § 506.120-.190.
67. Id. § 211.453 (Supp. 1983). A putative father is required to receive notice if
his identity is known, he can be personally served, and he has acknowledged the child
by affirmatively asserting his paternity.
68. Id. § 211.442-.492 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
69. See id. § 453.040, .060 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Like § 211.442, § 453.060
allows a court to waive notice if the putative father has acknowledged the child.
70. 600 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
71. Id. at 92. The court noted four methods used in other states: (1) paying the
mother's medical and hospital expenses related to the pregnancy; (2) supporting the
child in a continuous and regular manner; (3) living with the mother and child as a
family. unit; and (4) receiving the child into his home and openly holding out the child
as his natural child. Id. at 92; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062 (1977 & West Supp.
1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 578-2 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.26 (1982); UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (1973), 9A U.L.A. 579 (1979).
72. In resolving whether the parental rights of putative fathers under the due
process clause are adequately protected by the notice provisions in the termination of
parental rights and adoption statutes, two separate questions must be answered. First,
do the provisions adequately protect the parental rights of those putative fathers who
have established a significant personal, financial, or custodial relationship with their
illegitimate child? Second, do the provisions adequately protect a putative father's inchoate relationship with his child? Although the latter question was directly addressed
in Lehr, the Court specifically declined to decide whether New York adoption law adequately protects the parental rights of putative fathers who have developed significant
custodial, personal, or financial relationships with their illegitimate children. 103 S.Ct.
at 2994. Since the Court has provided insufficient guidance to answer the first question,
except that notice to a putative father who has established a significant relationship
with his child would at least have to meet the Lehr test, this Note will address only the
latter question.
73. Id. at 2994-95.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss3/8
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adoption notice scheme is constitutionally suspect because it is likely to omit
many responsible fathers.
Under section 211.447, 4 the juvenile officer is required to make a preliminary inquiry to see whether a termination of parental rights petition is to be
filed. After a petition is filed, the trial judge can order the juvenile officer to
conduct further inquiry into the circumstances underlying the petition. Unless
the parent has consented in writing to termination of parental rights, "an investigation and social study shall be made by the juvenile officer, the state
division of family services or other public or private agency authorized or licensed to care for children as directed by the court. 17 5 Therefore, notice to the
putative father depends to some extent upon the diligence of the inquiry by the
juvenile officer or the State Division of Family Services (DFS).
The mother of an illegitimate child can easily deprive an interested putative father of the right to notice of the termination and adoption proceedings
by declining to identify the father to the juvenile officer, DFS, or the court.
The judge has limited ability to compel identification. 78 Thus, under the termination-adoption scheme, the mother can easily frustrate the ability of the putative father to establish a legally significant relationship with his child by
concealing the child's whereabouts, consenting to the child's adoption, or refusing to identify the putative father.
It is unclear whether the Missouri termination-adoption scheme can be
characterized as "likely to omit many responsible fathers."' 7 No statutory formulation could effectively prevent the mother of an illegitimate child from
refusing to identify the putative father.7 8 The factor which makes the notice
provisions in the termination-adoption procedure constitutionally suspect, however, is that, unlike New York's scheme, it is not clear that the qualifications
for notice in Missouri are within the control of an interested putative father. A
putative father registry, although premised on the legal fiction that persons
have constructive notice of the law, gives the putative father control over his
ability to receive notice. There is no such registry in Missouri, nor is there a
functional equivalent.
The methods of affirmatively asserting paternity listed by the court in
Corrigan could serve as functional equivalents of a registry system, but each is
flawed. The first method of affirmatively asserting paternity involves filing an
74.

(Supp. 1983).

75. Id. § 211.472 (1978). In many adoption cases, DFS is heavily involved in
placing and supervising the child. The agency often investigates the prospective adoptive parents and sometimes counsels the natural parents. Wellington v. Grieshaber, 631
S.W.2d 883, 885 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).

76. See State ex reL T.A.B. v. Corrigan, 600 S.W.2d 87, 94 (Mo. Ct. App.

1980) (prohibiting juvenile court judge from holding the mother of an illegitimate child
guilty of contempt for refusing to identify the putative father at a hearing to terminate
her parental rights).
77. 103 S.Ct. at 2994-95.
78. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
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affidavit with the court. 9 Unless the affidavit happens to be filed with the
court which handles the termination and adoption proceedings, there is no
guarantee the putative father will receive notice of the proceedings because no
formal mechanism ensures that the court handling the termination proceeding
will be made aware of the affidavit.8"
The second method requires the putative father to place his name on the
birth certificate. 81 Unfortunately, the putative father cannot have his name
placed on the birth certificate without the written consent of the mother, unless a determination of paternity has been made by a court of competent jurisdiction. 82 Since a court must either determine paternity or the mother must
give written consent, this method of qualifying for notice is beyond the control
of an interested putative father.
The third method of affirmatively asserting paternity involves seeking an
admission of paternity from the mother and filing it with the court.8 3 This
method is also deficient in that the mother is free to withhold consent."
The notice provisions in the Missouri termination-adoption procedure are
directed to reach fathers who have established significant relationships with
their children. A putative father qualifies for notice if he acknowledges the
child by affirmatively asserting his paternity.8 5 On its face, the Missouri
scheme seems less constitutionally suspect than New York's because qualifying for notice in Missouri is more open-ended. To qualify for notice in New
York, the putative father must affirm his paternity within one of the statutorily recognized methods.88 In comparison, the Missouri scheme gives discretion
to the trial judge to determine whether a putative father qualifies for notice.
If the facts of Lehr were analyzed under Missouri law, Lehr would have
qualified for notice, since he filed his paternity petition prior to entry of the
adoption order.8 7 It is not at all certain, however, that Lehr would have actu79. 600 S.W.2d at 92. Presumably the court intended that the affidavit could be
filed in any state court.
80. It probably is not the practice of the juvenile officer to contact every other
court in Missouri or other states to determine whether a putative father has filed such
an affidavit. It seems unreasonable to impose this burden, particularly since a putative
father registry is an efficient alternative.
81. 600 S.W.2d at 92.
82. 13 Mo. ADMIN. CODE § 50-150.010(2) (1978).
83. 600 S.W.2d at 92.
84. Id.; see note 71 and accompanying text supra. Nor are the methods of affirmatively asserting paternity used in other states pointed out by Corriganwithin the
control of an interested putative father since the mother can refuse financial assistance
and conceal the whereabouts of the child. Moreover, these methods of affirmatively
asserting paternity involve the establishment of a significant personal, custodial, and
financial relationship with the child. Therefore, these alternatives are irrelevant to the
issue of procedural safeguards for notice to protect the putative father's opportunity to
establish a significant relationship with his child.
85. See notes 64-69 and accompanying text supra.
86. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
87. Although no Missouri court has so held, filing a paternity petition presumahttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss3/8
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ally received notice of the termination and adoption proceedings. The child's
mother would not have identified Lehr to the court nor could she be compelled
to do so by threat of a contempt citation. 8 If the juvenile court had contacted
all other courts in the state to see if a paternity petition had been filed, then
Lehr may have been identified and received notice. If not, Lehr would not
have received notice and an opportunity to be heard. As a result, Lehr could
have successfully challenged the constitutionality of the Missouri scheme as
applied because he qualified for, but did not receive notice.
The New York law was held constitutional because the decision to forego
a more open-ended notice requirement was not arbitrary, and because the legitimate state interest in facilitating expeditious adoption justifies a trial
judge's determination to require that all interested parties adhere precisely to
the procedural requirements of the statute.89 The Missouri scheme gives the
trial judge more discretion to determine when notice to a putative father is
required. Thus, adoption orders in Missouri are more susceptible to challenge
on constitutional grounds by putative fathers who were entitled to notice but
failed to receive notice. Because of its suspect constitutionality, the Missouri
statutory scheme casts doubt over the finality of adoption orders entered under
its provisions.
Under Missouri law, it is possible for a child to be adopted under the
provisions in chapter 4530, without resort to a termination of parental rights
proceeding under chapter 211.1 In fact, this procedure was followed in one
reported case where questions arose concerning the adequacy of notice to a
putative father.92
The notice requirements relevant to putative fathers are similar to their
counterparts in the termination-adoption procedure. Under the Missouri adoption statute, 93 a putative father must be served with a summons and a copy of
the petition unless: his parental rights have been previously terminated; he has
waived the necessity of his consent to a future adoption of the child; the court
finds that his identity is unknown and cannot be ascertained; or the court finds
that he has not acknowledged the child as his own by affirmatively asserting
94
his paternity.
For the most part, the notice provisions affecting putative fathers in chapter 453 involve the same qualifications and considerations as the notice provisions in chapter 211. Nevertheless, there is an important difference. Under the
termination of parental rights notice provisions, a putative father who has not
bly would
88.
1980).
89.
90.
91.
92.

be a sufficient assertion of paternity.
See State ex rel. T.A.B. v. Corrigan, 600 S.W.2d 87, 94 (Mo. Ct. App.

103 S. Ct. at 2995.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.015-.170 (1978 & Vernon Supp. 1984).
Id. § 211.442-.492.
See J.B.B. v. Baby Girl S., 611 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
93. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.015-.170 (1978 & Vernon Supp. 1984).
94. See id. § 453.015, .030, .040, .060 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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acknowledged his child by affirmatively asserting his paternity is not entitled
to notice, even where his identity is known to the court.95 Under chapter 453,
however, if the putative father's identity is known, he is entitled to notice regardless of whether he has acknowledged the child by affirmatively asserting
his paternity. 9
The guardian ad litem is the only person involved in the adoption proceeding who has a significant interest in identifying the putative father and
ensuring that he becomes involved in the proceeding. 97 The guardian ad litem
represents the best interests of the child. These interests include ensuring that
the adoption order is not unreasonably subject to challenge by a party whose
constitutionally protected parental rights were adversely affected. There are
practical and financial limitations, however, to the guardian ad litem's ability
to conduct an inquiry sufficient to determine whether a putative father entitled
to notice under the statute exists.
If the facts of Lehr were analyzed under the non-termination statutory
notice scheme, Lehr may have qualified for but likely would not have received
notice of the adoption proceeding. If the court learned of Lehr's identity
through the investigation by the juvenile officer or DFS, then Lehr would have
qualified for notice. 98 Since Jessica's mother was unwilling to identify Lehr as
the father, however, it is very unlikely Lehr would have actually received notice of the proceeding.
To the extent that the notice provisions under the non-termination procedure resemble or are identical to their counterparts under the terminationadoption procedure, they suffer the same constitutional infirmities. The notice
provisions for putative fathers in chapter 453 do not adequately protect a putative father's opportunity to establish a significant relationship with his child
because these provisions are likely to omit many fathers, and qualification for
notice is beyond an interested putative father's ability to control. Even if these
notice provisions are facially adequate, they are suspect as applied in many
95. See notes 64-68 and accompanying text supra. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.070
(1978) contains a provision similar to that in § 211.472 in that, except where all parents required to give consent have consented, no adoption decree involving a minor
child shall be entered until a full investigation has been made by a juvenile court officer, DFS, or any entity involved in the care and placement of children.
96. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.015, .030, .040, .060 (Vernon Supp. 1984). From
this standpoint, the notice provisions activated under a non-termination adoption procedure are less constitutionally suspect than those involved in the "termination-adoption"
procedure. The former more adequately protect the putative father's inchoate relationship with his child.
97. To the extent that DFS is involved in the adoption proceeding, the agency
could be responsible for conducting a diligent inquiry to identify and locate the putative
father. DFS would have little incentive to conduct a diligent search for the father since
this would conflict with their interest in expeditiously resolving the adoption. See Wellington v. Grieshaber, 631 S.W.2d 883, 885-887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (discussion of
DFS's conflicting responsibilities).
98. See note 96 and accompanying text infra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss3/8
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cases where a putative father has developed a significant relationship with his
child, yet received no notice of a subsequent adoption proceeding because the
court was not aware of his existence.
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Lehr, two main problems afflict Missouri's statutory scheme for providing notice to putative fathers of
legal proceedings affecting their parental rights. First, the notice provisions are
facially suspect under the due process clause and raise doubt concerning the
finality of adoption orders entered pursuant to statute."" Second, because qualification for notice is "open-ended," orders are susceptible to challenge on constitutional grounds by those putative fathers entitled to notice who did not
receive it. The first problem can adequately be addressed by establishing a
putative father registry. Such a system would ensure that qualification for notice is within the control of an interested putative father.
There are advantages and disadvantages to a putative father registry. 00
For example, a registry system reduces the need for time-consuming efforts to
locate the father of the child. Additionally, a registry system can help thwart
the mother's efforts to defeat a father's parental interest by refusing to disclose
his identity. One drawback is that "[e]ven if enacted in all states, [the registry's] effective operation requires an interstate cross-registration system. Otherwise a mother intending to frustrate the interests of a properly registered
father could place the child with an out-of-state agency."''1 1 More importantly,
the registry is based, at least in part, on the fiction that persons have constructive notice of laws that affect their interests. Unless well-publicized, it is
doubtful that many putative fathers would be aware or take advantage of such
a registry. The danger also exists that a court or a guardian ad litem would be
content to consult the registry rather than diligently seek to determine the
identity of a putative father. The registry system should constitute an additional procedural safeguard rather than the backbone of the notice procedure.
The second problem could be addressed similarly to the Lehr situation.
Requisite methods of acknowledging the child by affirmatively asserting paternity could be specifically listed in the statutes. The methods noted by Corrigan
99. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.140 (1978) provides that "[a]fter the expiration of
one year from the date of entry of the decree of adoption, the validity thereof shall not
be subject to attack in any proceedings, collateral or direct, by reason of any irregularity in proceedings had pursuant to this chapter." In In re Adams, 237 S.W.2d 232, 234
(Mo. Ct. App. 1951), the court held that failure to give notice of an adoption proceeding to the natural father was not a "mere irregularity in the proceeding." Thus, the
decree was void to the extent that it purported to terminate all legal relationship between the natural father and his child. Adams involved interpretation of Mo. REy.
STAT. § 9616d (1939) (repealed 1947), a predecessor to current § 453.140 (1978). In a
more recent case, the court of appeals held that § 453.140 precludes an attack on the
validity of an adoption decree on the grounds that the judgment was procured by false
testimony that the natural father had abandoned the child. In re Kerr, 547 S.W.2d
837, 839-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
100. See Note, supra note 4, at 528.
101. Id. at 528.
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or provided in the New York statute could be used. The main advantage of
this approach is that it ensures the finality of many adoption orders by narrowing the bases upon which a constitutional challenge to the order could be
mounted by a putative father. Unless a putative father qualifies for notice
under one of the applicable provisions, his due process rights would be protected. 10 2 The disadvantage of this approach, which is the advantage of an
open-ended notice requirement, is that the trial judge has less discretion to
determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a putative father's relationship
with the child is such that prior notice and an opportunity to be heard is required. Perhaps this discretionary element can be built into a "closed" notice
requirement scheme. The statute could provide that the trial judge may give
notice to a putative father not otherwise entitled to receive notice where the
father's identity is known and his interest in the child is such that justice requires he receive notice. This type of provision would ensure that the notice
103
provisions retain the advantages of both "open" and "closed" schemes.
Until legislative modification of the notice provisions occurs, there are
several things which can be done to protect the parental rights of putative
fathers while ensuring the finality of adoption orders. First, trial court judges
can insist that any adoption order be preceded by a diligent and full inquiry to
determine the identity and locate the putative father. Additionally, the judge
can strongly urge the mother to divulge the father's name. The guardian ad
litem should also actively encourage the mother to identify the father. If the
mother appears able, but unwilling to do so, in the appropriate case the guardian ad litem should refuse to enter into the adoption agreement. If an adoption
order is entered over the guardian ad litem's objections, this order should be
appealed to resolve important constitutional questions concerning the procedural adequacy of the notice provisions.
Lehr is narrowly focused on its facts; consequently, the decision does not
offer clear guidance for determining the constitutionality of statutes with notice provisions differing from those in the New York adoption statutes. Analysis of Missouri's statutory scheme in light of Lehr, however, indicates that it is
constitutionally suspect. Revision of the notice provisions in the Missouri
scheme would alleviate the uncertainty which undermines the validity of many
adoption decrees entered under the present statutes.
JOHN

L.

ROARK

102. 103 S. Ct. at 2995.
103. If the New York statute had contained this provision, Lehr could have challenged as an abuse of discretion the Ulster County Family Court's refusal to provide
him notice and an opportunity to be heard.
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